The reform of the Public Administration in Singapore: a model to follow in Italy? by Benedetto Francesco, Ballatore
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The reform of the Public Administration
in Singapore: a model to follow in Italy?
Ballatore Benedetto Francesco
Italian Ministry of Agricultural, Food and Forestry Policies
29. December 2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/52685/
MPRA Paper No. 52685, posted 6. January 2014 05:50 UTC
The  reform  of  the  Public  Administration  in  Singapore:  a  model  to  follow  in  Italy?  
  
Introduction  
The  development  of  Singapore   into  a  modern   industrial   economy  started   since   its   independence   from  
the   United   Kingdom   in   1959   and   was   strongly   driven   by   the   governments   sustained   by   the   People  
Action  Party   (PAP).   Indeed,  Singapore’s  governments  were  characterised  as  heavily   involved   in  every  
area   of   the   national   development,   thanks   also   to   a   highly   competent   and   least   corrupted   public  
administration  in  the  world.  
In   relation   to   that,   the   PAP   and   its   historical   leader   Lee   Kwan   Yew   understood   that   both   a   robust  
economy  and  an   efficient  welfare   could  be   carried  out,   reforming   the  public   sector   towards   a   level   of  
efficiency   comparable   to   those   of   the   wealthy   Western   countries   (Scandinavian   countries,   Germany,  
France  and  Switzerland).    
The  continuous  upgrading  of  the  Singapore  Civil  Service  (SCS)  permitted  to  build,  for  example,  a  robust  
infrastructure,  a  high  quality  public  housing  system  and  an  excellent  education  model.  Nowadays,   the  
SCS   is   known   for   the  high   level   of  meritocracy,   a   strong   focus  on   the   integrated   strategic  planning,   a  
high   capacity   to   support   the   public   and   private   companies’   businesses,   lack   of   corruption,   ability   to  
ensure  a  high  level  of  technical-­‐‑scientific  and  humanistic  knowledge  through  an  innovative  educational  
system.  
On   the   contrary,   many   other   countries,   among   which   wealthy   nations   as   well,   are   facing   severe  
challenges  regarding  the  effectiveness  of   their  public-­‐‑service  organizations  because  the  work  rules  and  
the  promotion  schemes  reward  longevity  rather  than  performance.  This  produces  substantial  slashing  of  
the  employees’  performance  and  also  high  levels  of  endemic  corruption,  which  are  often  related  to  high  
levels  of  inefficiency.  
Most  of  these  problems  are  present  in  the  Italian  public  administration  (P.A.),  which  since  the  end  of  the  
1970s   has   not   been  modernized   properly   despite   the   high   number   of   reforms   carried   out   in   the   last  
thirty-­‐‑five   years.   The   Italian   P.A.   suffers   from   evident   dysfunctions   and   inefficient   efforts,   due   to   its  
inner   bureaucratic   inertia.   The   consequence   of   that   is   the   slash   of   the   Italian   economy,   a   decline  well  
related   to   the   deterioration   of   the   main   Worldwide   Governance   Indicators   (WGI) 1   (rule   of   law,  
government   effectiveness   and   control   of   corruption,   closely   related   to   the   P.A.   efficiency   and  
competence).    
However,   the   improvement   of   the   efficiency   and   the   effectiveness   of   the   public   sector   receive   little  
attention   in   the   national   political   debate,   making   it   difficult   to   sort   out   a   sustained   effort   to   combat  
corruption,   foster   adherence   to   the   rule   of   law   and   improve   the   efficiency   of   the   administration   in  
general.  
Although   Singapore   has   some  distinctive   features   similar   to   other   countries,   in  many   aspects   its   past  
administrative   and   socio-­‐‑economics   problems   resemble   (in   a   smaller   scale)   those   affecting   Italy.   Of  
course,  not  every  feature  of  Singapore’s  public  service  is  politically  feasible  for  a  country  like  Italy,  but  
there   are   several   elements   which   could   be   readily   incorporated   into   the   current   organization   of   the  
Italian  P.A.  
This  paper   is   structured   as   follows:   Section   2  provides   some   elements   of   Singapore’s  modern  history.  
Section  3  illustrates  the  institutional  structure  of  Singapore  and  the  role  of  the  People  Action  Party  (PAP)  
in   its   modernization   process.   Section   4   describes   the   SCS   organization   and   the   main   reforms   that  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1WGI   are   a   research   dataset   summarizing   the   views   on   the   quality   of   governance   provided   by   a   large   number   of   enterprise,  
citizen  and  expert  survey  respondents  in  industrial  and  developing  countries.  These  data  are  gathered  from  a  number  of  survey  
institutes,  think  tanks,  non-­‐‑governmental  organizations,  international  organization,.  The  WGI  do  not  reflect  the  official  views  of  
the  World  Bank,   its  Executive  Directors,   or   the   countries   they   represent.   The  WGI   are  not  used  by   the  World  Bank  Group   to  
allocate  resources.  
  
2  Autonomous  government  agencies  qualified  to  perform  specific  administrative  functions.  
	  
3  Saxena  N.C,  Virtuous  Cycles:  The  Singapore  Public  Service  and  National  Development,   edited  by   the  United  Nations  Development  
Programme,  2011.  
4  Developmental   state,   or  hard   state,   is   a   term  used  by   international  political   economy  scholars   to   refer   to   the  phenomenon  of  
  
improved  the  quality  of  the  public  services.  Section  5  provides  specific  case  studies  which  illustrate  the  
evolution  of  Singapore’s  public  institutions  from  the  early  sixties  until  nowadays.  Section  6  depicts  the  
main  features,  which  afflict  the  Italian  P.A.  efficiency.  Section  7  examines  if  some  Singapore’s  attitudinal  
and  institutional  reforms  can  be  introduced  in  the  Italian  bureaucratic  system  and  conclusions.  
  
2.  The  recent  history  of  the  Republic  of  Singapore:  an  overview  
Since  1819  Singapore  was  under  the  domination  of  the  British  East  India  Company.  From  1826  to  1867  
Singapore  was  part  of  the  Straits  Settlements,  which  were  governed  by  the  British  East  India  Company.  
In   1867,   the   Straits   Settlements  were  made   a   crown   colony  by  Britain  with   the   appointment   of   a   new  
governor  who  was  supported  by  an  executive  and  legislative  council.  In  that  period  Singapore  became  
an   important   commercial   port   because   of   the   opening   of   the   Suez   Canal   in   1869   and   also   because  
steamships  became  the  major  form  of  ocean  transport.    
In  1948,  after  the  Second  World  War,  Singapore  was  a  component  of  the  Malaya  Federation  retaining  its  
status  of  a  separate  crown  colony.  During  this  period,  the  Communist  Party  (which  was  quite  powerful  
in  the  Malaya  Federation)  affected  negatively  the  social  and  economic  life  of  Singapore,  with  continuous  
and  violent  riots.  Consequently  in  1956  the  organizations  suspected  to  be  pro-­‐‑Communist  were  banned  
by  the  colonial  government.  In  1953  a  British  commission  recommended  partial  internal  self-­‐‑government  
for  Singapore,  prompting  the  emergence  of  several  political  parties  in  1954,  including  the  Labour  Front  
(Lin,  2010).    
David   Marshall,   leader   of   the   pro-­‐‑independence   party   Labour   Front,   won   Singapore'ʹs   first   general  
elections  in  1955.  Demanding  complete  self-­‐‑rule  he  led  a  delegation  to  London  but  was  turned  down  by  
the   British.   He   resigned   when   he   returned   and   was   replaced   by   Lim   Yew   Hock,   whose   policies  
convinced  Britain  to  grant  Singapore  a  full   internal  self-­‐‑government  for  all  matters  except  defence  and  
foreign   affairs.   In   the   1959   election,   the   PAP  won   and   Singapore   became   an   internally   self-­‐‑governing  
state  with  Lee  Kuan  Yew  as   first  Prime  Minister.   In  1962,   the  Singaporean  voters  approved   the  PAP’s  
merger   plan   with   Malaya   and   on   September   of   the   1963   Singapore   joined   the   new   Federation   of  
Malaysia.    
However,  Singapore’s  position  within   the   federation  was   turbulent  because  of   the   substantial  political  
differences   with   Malaya   concerning   the   management   of   the   governmental   issues   (the   leadership   of  
Singapore   regarded   multiracialism   and   meritocracy   as   critical   principles,   while   the   Malaysian   ruling  
elite  favoured  affirmative  action  for  the  Malay  community)  and  also  because  Singapore,  as  a  state,  did  
not   achieve   the   economic   progress   pretended   by   the   PAP’s   political   elite,   considering   the   continuous  
tensions  between  the  Chinese-­‐‑dominated  Singapore  and  the  Malay-­‐‑dominated  Kuala  Lumpur.  
In  1965  the  Government  of  Malaysia  decided  to  separate  Singapore  from  the  fledgling  federation,  and  so  
Singapore  enhanced  the  status  of  sovereign  independent  nation.  
  
3.  The  institutional  framework  of  Singapore  and  its  political  dynamics:  the  role  of  the  People'ʹs  Action  
Party  in  the  development  of  modern  Singapore.  
Since  its  independence  Singapore  was  organized  as  a  parliamentary  republic.  Its  structure  was  patterned  
on  the  British  system  of  parliamentary  government:  executive  power  lies  with  the  prime  minister  and  his  
cabinet   who   directs   and   controls   the  ministries   which   are   accountable   to   parliament   as   concerns   the  
action   and   decisions   of   their   department.   Considering   its   small   size,   Singapore   has   only   one   level   of  
government  composed  of  15  ministries,  23  government  departments  and  68  statutory  boards.      
The  government  has  the  responsibility  of  the  budget  planning  and  of  the  supervision  of  the  majority  of  
the   key   services;   actually,   some   of   these   have   been   delegated   to   statutory   boards2.   Such   institutional  
framework   has   been   the   result   of   the   intensive   political   action   set   up   during   the   last   forty   years  
performed  by  the  PAP,  which  since  1959  has  had  to  deal  with  several  problems  connected  with  the  need  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  Autonomous  government  agencies  qualified  to  perform  specific  administrative  functions.  
	  
to   provide   basic   education,   health,   housing,   and   livelihood   to   its   people3.   The   PAP   faced   other  
difficulties  caused  by  the  failure  of  the  merger  with  Malaysia  (upon  which  it  has  built  its  initial  platform)  
and  by  a  tense  domestic  climate:  racial  tensions,  high  levels  of  unemployment,  illiteracy  and  poverty.  
Consequently,  the  Prime  Minister  Lee  Kuan  Yew  and  his  ministers  increased  the  role  of  the  government  
institutions   with   the   aim   to   improve   the   socio-­‐‑economic   conditions   of   Singapore   (for   example   in  
establishing   an   inclusive   growth  within   the   Singapore’s   population).   The  majority   of   the   Singapore’s  
government  aims  were  grasped  when  it  left  the  Malaysian  Federation  in  1965  to  become  an  independent  
nation.    
In   fact,   the   PAP   understood   that   the   application   of   the   socialist   agenda   (within   the   Malaysian  
Federation)   was   not   suitable   to   solve   the   Singapore’s   population   problems,   and   adopted   a  
developmental  state’s4  government  programme  which  was  already  successfully  applied  in  Japan,  South  
Korea  and  Taiwan.    
Singapore’s   government   in   1965,   having   cleared   its   social   and   economic   policy   goals,   set   up   its  
developmental  policy  and  strategic  outcomes  (which  still  lead  its  political  choices)  as  reported  below:  
  
1)  Effective  Government    
• Dynamic  forward–looking  Public  Service  leadership  
• Rule  of  Law  
• Incorruptible  public  officer  
• Customer-­‐‑centric  and  consultative  government  
• Fiscal  sustainability  and  Effective  /  efficient  use  of  financial  resources  
2)  Robust  Social  Security  
• Financial  security  
• Good  and  affordable  healthcare  
• Affordable  quality  public  housing  
3)  Sustainable  Economic  Growth  
• Robust  engines  of  growth  and  macroeconomics  stability  
• Conducive  to  business,  entrepreneurship  and  good  job  opportunities  
• Robust  infrastructures  
4)  Secure  Nation  
• Sovereign  and  secure  Singapore  and  strong  national  identity  and  resilience;  
• Preparedness  for  crisis  
• Congenial  international  business  
5)  Cohesive  Society  
• Quality  education    
• Racial  and  religious  harmony  and  caring  and  inclusive  society  
  
The  developmental  agenda  was  planned  by  the  Singapore’s  government  taking  into  account  an  increase  
of  the  percentage  of  employed  people  (considering  that  the  unemployment  rate  was  estimated  at  13.5  %)  
and  a  growth  of  the  number  of  high-­‐‑quality  houses  for  the  population,  an  improvement  of  the  education  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  Saxena  N.C,  Virtuous  Cycles:  The  Singapore  Public  Service  and  National  Development,   edited  by   the  United  Nations  Development  
Programme,  2011.  
4  Developmental   state,   or  hard   state,   is   a   term  used  by   international  political   economy  scholars   to   refer   to   the  phenomenon  of  
state-­‐‑led  macroeconomic  planning  in  East  Asia  in  the  late  twentieth  century.  In  this  model  of  capitalism  (sometimes  referred  to  as  
state  development  capitalism),  the  state  has  more  independent,  or  autonomous,  political  power,  as  well  as  more  control  over  the  
economy.  A  developmental  state  has  a  number  of  features  (among  them  are  the  competent  state  agency  and  the  careful  industrial  
policies),  which  allow  it  to  play  a  strategic  role  in  directing  the  course  of  a  nation’s  economic  and  social  growth.  
  
and   healthcare   level   and   a   reduction   of   the   left-­‐‑wing   political   organizations   strikes   that   waked   the  
Singapore’s  economy.    
The  PAP’s  government  representatives  were  conscious  that  the  above  mentioned  aims  could  be  reached  
by   an   administration   reform   (in   order   to   create   an   autonomous   and   efficient   bureaucracy,   with   the  
national  economic  development  as  main  political  objective)  and  through  specific  institutional  institutes,  
where  the  government  cooperated  with  the  business  sector  in  order  to  reach  the  national  economic  and  
social  goals.    
  
4.  Reforming  Singapore’s  Public  Service:  the  first  step  for  the  social  and  economic  growth  
Nowadays  Singapore’s  public  sector  employs  almost  120,000  people;  among  them  are  the  civil  servants  
who  work   in   15  ministries   and   the  public  officers   employed   in   62   statutory  boards.  What   is  normally  
called  the  SCS  excludes  the  statutory  boards  (government-­‐‑owned  enterprises)  and  the  Singapore  Armed  
Forces.  Finally,  the  SCS  employs  approximately  63,000  staff,  or  55%  of  the  overall  public  sector.    
In   the  Civil   Service  almost   300  public  officers  belong   to   the   elite  Administrative  Service  and  hold  key  
leadership  positions  in  government  ministries  and  the  major  statutory  boards  as  well  as  to  government  
linked   companies.   The   bureaucratic   organization’s   structure   is   in   line  with   the   parliamentary   form  of  
government   discussed   above,   being   organized   along   the   Westminster   lines   as   a   career   service  
subordinate  and  loyal  to  the  government  (Painter  2004)5.    
The   government   in   1959   commenced   an   effective   administrative   reform   process   that   rationalized   the  
structure   and   the   procedures   of   the   public   bureaucracy   and   aimed   to   promote   organizational  
effectiveness  and  attain  national  development  goals.  Through  this  reform,  there  was  a  reorganization  of  
the  SCS,  establishment  of  new  statutory  boards  and  change  of  the  colonial  mentality  of  the  civil  servants  
and  their  insensitivity  to  the  population’s  needs  6.  
In   general   terms   the   reform   embraced   the   structural   organization   of   the   SCS,   the   closure   of   the  
ineffective   statutory  boards   (and   their   replacement  with  more  efficient  and  effective  agencies)  and   the  
establishment  of  the  Political  Study  Centre  to  change  civil  servants’  attitudes.    
During  time  the  activities  of   the  Centre  comprised  of  setting  up  principles  and  consequential  practices  
which  constituted  the  core  of  Singapore’s  public  sector  reform:    
1)   strong   political  will   and   example   of   political   leaders   and   public   servants   in   terms   of   integrity   and  
honesty  (through  strict  adherence  to  a  code  of  conduct);    
2)  constant  re-­‐‑inventing  of  the  way  the  Government  does  its  business  in  response  to  external  challenges;  
3)  meritocracy  and  equal  opportunities  for  all  in  terms  of  open  and  fair  recruitment  and  selection  based  
on  educational  qualifications  and  relevant  experience;    
4)  effective  performance  appraisal;    
5)  market  rates  for  civil  servants;    
6)  continual  learning  by  doing  and  through  constant  review  and  improvement;    
7)  determination  to  make  and  implement  difficult  decisions.  
In  the  early  1980s  the  government  introduced  significant  reforms  whose  aims  were  the  improvement  of  
the  public  sector’s  capability  to  deliver  high  quality  services  and  more  devolved  financial  management.  
They  touched  the  areas  of:  
a)  “Budget  reform”  has  been  characterised  by  close  inter-­‐‑ministerial  co-­‐‑operation,  the  use  of  constitutional  
fiscal  rules,  spending  ceilings  for  ministries  (through  the  so-­‐‑called  block  budget  system)  across  the  board  
budget  extractions  (spending  cuts),  endowment  funds,  central  manpower  controls,  and  continual  under-­‐‑
spending.    
Therefore,  under   the  supervision  of   the  Ministry  of  Finance  (MOF),  which  must  ensure   that   the  public  
sector  is  efficient  and  prudent  in  using  public  funds  (establishing  limits  in  terms  of  how  the  public  sector  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  M.   Painter,   The   Politics   of   Administrative   Reform   in   East   and   Southeast   Asia:   From   Gridlock   to   Continuous   Self-­‐‑Improvement?  
Governance,  2004,  p.  361–386.  
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departments  must  use  these  funds  through  caps  funding  to  the  ministries  at  a  fixed  percentage  of  GDP),  
Singapore’s  public  finance  management  nowadays  is  characterised  by:    
• credibility  of  the  budget  that  is  implemented  as  planned;    
• comprehensiveness  and  transparency  of  the  budget  and  fiscal  risk  (fiscal  and  budget  information  
are  accessible  to  the  public);    
• policy-­‐‑based   budgeting   because   the   budget   is   prepared   with   due   regard   to   the   government  
policy;    
• predictability  and  control  in  the  budget  execution,  since  the  budget  is  implemented  in  an  orderly  
and  predictable  manner  and  there  are  arrangements  for  the  exercise  of  control  and  stewardship  
in  the  use  of  public  funds;    
• adequate  records  and  information  are  produced,  maintained  and  disseminated  to  meet  decision-­‐‑
making  control,  management  and  reporting  purposes;    
• external  scrutiny  and  audit  arrangements  for  analysis  of  the  public  finances.  
  
Any  ministerial  department  that  uses  less  than  95  %  of  its  budget  the  following  year  will  have  it  adjusted  
downwards   to   better   reflect   its   real   needs.   MOF   also   extracts   from   each   department’s   budget   a  
productivity  dividend  pegged  to  the  national  productivity  growth  rate.      
Contributions  are  pooled  to  a  common  fund  from  which  all  the  agencies  can  bid  for  the  use  of  funds,  for  
new  worthwhile  projects.  The  ministries  can  also  decide  how  to  spend  their  operating  budgets  and  move  
funds   between   their   personnel   and   other   operating   costs.   In   this   way,   ministries   can   move   funds  
between  their  operating  and  development  expenditure.        
So,   with   this   approach   Singapore   in   both   good   and   bad   times   can   store   relevant   surpluses   while  
continuing  to  invest  in  high  value  infrastructure  also  during  these  years.  Consequently,  all  departments  
try  to  accumulate  a  budget  surplus  to  have  some  savings  to  draw  upon  in  bad  years:  for  example  during  
the  unexpected  downturn  in  2002,  the  SARS  outbreak  in  2003  and  the  recent  financial  crisis.  
b)  ‘Balanced  corporatisation/privatisation  and  establishment  of  the  statutory  boards’  was  characterised  by  a  fair  
privatisation,   based   on   the   principles   of   the   developmental   state.   Consequently   the   government  
achieved   a   progressive   devolution   of   many   traditional   roles   and   functions.   However,   a   degree   of  
government  control   is  still  maintained  through  share  ownership   in   the  numerous  state  and  quasi-­‐‑state  
companies.  
A   mixture   of   privatisation,   corporatisation,   formation   of   statutory   boards   and   other   managerial  
initiatives  has  been  used  as   tools   to  enhance  and  maintain  efficiency  of   the  government  organisations.  
The  statutory  boards,   through  partial  or  full  privatization,  enjoyed  more  flexibility   in  the  financial  and  
personnel   management   (i.e.   they   are   exempt   from   many   of   the   central   management   controls   which  
apply   to   the   departments).   This   increased   the   operational   independence   and   is   cited   as   the   key-­‐‑
motivating  factor  for  the  transformation  of  the  departments  into  statutory  boards  7.  
The   shift   to   the   client-­‐‑oriented   public   administration   (attitudinal   reform)   has   been   an   important   step  
towards   a   public   administration   which   stands   closer   to   the   needs   of   the   citizens   by   providing  more  
efficient   customer-­‐‑based   services,   streamlining   rules,   procedures,   red-­‐‑tape,   computerisation   and   other  
approaches.    
This  process   initiated   in   the   early  1960s  and  was   targeted   to   change   the   colonial  mentality  of   the  SCS  
civil  servants.  It  has  been  implemented  during  these  years  through  a  two-­‐‑week  part-­‐‑time  training  course  
for  junior  and  senior  public  officers  in  order  to  modify  their  attitudes  and  their  awareness  about  the  local  
problems,  as  well  as  to  improve  their  problem  solving  capacity.  
The  most  recent   initiative  has  been  the  introduction  of   the  Public  Service  for  the  21st  century  (PS21),  a  
program   that   aims   to   create   a   culture   within   the   Civil   Service   that   welcomes   continuous   change   for  
greater  efficiency  and  effectiveness.    	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The  three-­‐‑fold  challenge  in  PS21  can  be  described  as:    
• anticipating  the  future  with  scenario-­‐‑based  strategic  planning;    
• fostering  positive  attitudes  among  staff  towards  a  continuous  change;    
• executing  change  as  effectively  and  efficiently  as  possible.    
  
Related  to  that,  the  SCS  is  capable  of  offering  a  wide  range  of  rigorous  training  for  its  employers,  which  
have  a  training  budget  to  spend  on  programs  provided  by  the  SCS  or  by  private  companies.  This  kind  of  
organization  requires  a  relevant  financial  investment,  considering  that  the  Civil  Service  College  can  offer  
to  its  employees  about  1,000  courses  on  different  subjects  (economics,  administration,  and  organizational  
development).  
c)  ‘Meritocratic  reform’  was  introduced  in  the  public  sector  in  the  early  1960s;  in  fact  the  PAP,  as  reported  
previously,   realized   that   the   colonial   civil   service   had   inherited   the   need   of   extensive   changes   if   the  
developmental   efforts   of   the   new   government   were   to   succeed.   Consequently   the   government  
commenced  a  programme  of  comprehensive  reforms  concerning  the  public  sector;  therefore  a  number  of  
steps  were  initiated  to  sensitize  the  SCS  to  the  needs  of  the  Singaporeans.  
First  of  all  the  government  initiated  a  strategy  of  selective  retention  and  retirement;  in  other  words  civil  
servants   with   a   proven   record   of   competence   were   retained   while   those   found   incompetent   were  
weeded   out.   While   choosing   whom   to   retain,   competence   was   the   only   consideration.   The   process  
resulted  in  the  exit  of  a  large  number  of  non-­‐‑performing  civil  servants.  
The  “meritocratic  reform”  in  the  public  sector  was  successful  also  because  the  government  understood  
that   an   employee-­‐‑centred   personnel   management   philosophy   was   necessary   for   the   civil   service   to  
attract,  motivate  and  retain  the  best  and  the  brightest  in  Singapore.  
In   few  years,   after   the   separation   from   the  Malaysia   federation  and   the  enhancement  of   the   sovereign  
independent  nation  status,  the  Singapore’s  government  started  a  pragmatic  recruitment  policy  of  high-­‐‑
level  candidates  who  were  attracted  to  join  the  SCS  because  of  a  relevant  investment  in  scholarships  and  
compensation.  
To  operate   in   this  way,   the  government  set  up  the  Public  Service  Commission  (PSC):   the  authority   for  
the  appointment  of  officers  to  the  Administrative  Service,  as  well  as  for  the  appointment  and  promotion  
of  officers  for  senior  appointments.  This  institution  was  established  on  1  January  1951  (as  a  statutory  and  
independent   body   to   advise   the   British  Governor   on  matters   related   to   the  Civil   Service   recruitment,  
appointment  and  promotion)  but  came  into  effect  in  1959  when  Singapore  achieved  self  –  government.  
In   line   with   the   constitutional   reforms   for   Singapore’s   self   –   government,   the   PSC  was   reconstituted  
more  as  an  executive  body  advising  the  government  on  the  appointment,  dismissal  and  discipline  of  the  
public   officers.  Nowadays,   the   PSC   still   continues   to   have   these   tasks   trying   always   to   hire   the   right  
person  on   the  basis  of   impartial  modalities;   this   independent  body   is   also   responsible   for  deciding  on  
disciplinary  matters,  appeals  for  promotion,  and  awards  of  PSC  scholarships.  
Regarding   the   latter,   in   order   to   attract   the   best   and   the   brightest   the   PSC   offers   very   attractive   and  
various  scholarships  (often  these  grants  allow  the  outstanding  students  to  attend  world-­‐‑class  universities  
abroad)   that   are   tailored   to   recruit   types   of   talented   and   young   people   with   strong   academic  
backgrounds  that  suit  the  needs  of  the  public  sector.  Students  who  accept  the  scholarships  are  “bonded”  
and  obliged  to  work  in  the  civil  service  upon  graduation  for  a  specified  number  of  years.    
During  the  last  thirty  years  the  administrative  institutions  built  their  capability  to  provide  high  quality  
services  to  the  populations,  applying  strict  modalities  (based  only  on  the  principle  of  meritocracy)  for  the  
recruitment  and  promotion  of   the  public  officers.  Furthermore,   the  promotion  and  ranking  of   the  civil  
servants  is  closely  related  to  the  qualifications,  performance  and  appraisal.    
The  civil  servants  in  Singapore  are  paid  at  market  rates  comparable  with  those  of  the  private  sector.  This  
factor  plays  an  important  role  for  the  government  to  attract  and  retain  an  appropriate  share  of  national  
talent.  The  human  resource  department,  the  so-­‐‑called  “Leadership  Development  Department”,  has  a  key  
role  for  choosing  talents  for  the  civil  service  leadership  positions.  
The  Singapore’s  public  sector  among  all   the  departments  adopts  an  assessment  system  based  on  merit  
and  that  looks  at  the  employees’  current  performance  and  their  potentials  to  reach  higher  positions,  not  
considering   their   seniority.   Consequently   Public   officers   who   rank   highly   in   both   performance   and  
potential  obtain  an  accelerated  promotion  schedule  and  a  higher  bonus  allocation.  
The  reform  of  the  public  sector  has  also  foreseen  elite  corps  of  high-­‐‑potential  employees  (as  distinct  from  
an  elite  group  of  employees  who  are  well  connected  by  virtue  of  their  social  class)  very  similar  to  some  
of   the  best  practices  of  private-­‐‑sector   companies:   rigorous   regulation   in   assigning  performance  grades  
has  as  a  result  a  uniform  assessment  in  all  the  components  of  the  public  service.  
During  the  annual  appraisal,  each  officer  would  be  appraised  on:    
• performance   during   the   past   years,   where   officers   are   assessed   (performance   ratings   are  
expressed  as  a,  b,  c,  d  or  e,  where  a  is  for  outstanding  performance  and  e  is  an  adverse  rating)  on  
their  performance  relative  to  their  substantive  grade;  this  means  that  an  officer  of  a  higher  grade  
would   be   measured   against   a   higher   standard   expected   of   that   grade,   as   he   will   have   more  
knowledge  or  experience  than  another  officer  of  a  lower  grade;    
• ‘Currently  Estimated  Potential’  (CEP),  which  refers  to  an  estimate  of  the  highest  appointment  or  
level  of  work  the  officer  can  handle  competently  before  retirement,  and  is  manifested  in  the  way  
the  officer  does  his  job.  
While   performance   assessment   is   a   good   gauge   of   an   individual’s   current   contributions   towards  
achieving   the  organisational  goals,   the  organisation  cannot   rely  exclusively  on  past  performance  as  an  
indicator  of  an  officer’s  ability  to  assume  different  or  more  senior  responsibilities.  Potential  assessment  is  
therefore  essential  for  distinguishing  varying  capabilities  so  as  to  better  develop  and  deploy  employees,  
and  to  ensure  that  officers  are  not  promoted  beyond  their  abilities.  
CEP   refers   to   an   estimation   of   the   highest   appointment   or   level   of   work   an   officer   can   handle  
competently  before  his/her  retirement.  CEP  is  assessed  considering  the  ability  to  look  at  a  problem  from  
higher  vantage  point  with   simultaneous   attention   to   relevant  details   and   the   so-­‐‑called   “Whole  Person  
Qualities”,  which  embraces  more  features  like  emotional  intelligence,  performance  in  small  groups  and  
feedback  from  team  members.  
These   kinds   of   procedures   are   in   contrast   to   the   assessment   of   most   other   public   services,   where  
performance  rankings  tend  to  cluster  in  the  top  two  grades8.  However,  the  CEP  is  a  key  determinant  of  
one’s  promotion  schedule;  consequently,  a  civil  servant’s  career-­‐‑development  plan  includes  training  and  
rotation  through  a  portfolio  of  topic  areas.    
After  six  to  eight  performance  review  cycles  one’s  final  CEP  is  relatively  fixed,  meaning  that  for  example  
a  public  administration  department  has  a  good  idea  of  the  leadership  level  that  the  candidate  will  attain  
by  the  age  of  45.  As  the  various  departments  plan  their  future  talent  needs  they  translate  those  plans  into  
a  CEP  quota,  which  gets  reviewed  each  year.  
c)  ‘Anticorruption  reform  (Prevention  of  Corruption  Act)’  could  be  considered  as  one  of  the  most  important  
reforms  carried  out  by   the  PAP  government.   In   fact,   since  Singapore  attained  self-­‐‑government   in  1959  
corruption  control  has  been  at  the  top  of  the  government  agenda.  When  the  PAP’s  government  took  over  
from   the   British,   corruption   was   prevalent   and   the   Prevention   of   Corruption   Ordinance   (originally  
enacted  by  the  British  government  in  1937)  was  weak.    
Therefore,  this  regulation  was  amended  and  replaced  with  the  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act  (POCA)  in  
1960,   which   was   more   comprehensive   in   scope   and   gave   to   the   government   more   powers   of  
enforcement,  taking  into  account  three  pillars:    
• effective  anti  corruption  acts  (or  laws);    
• effective  anti  corruption  Agency;    
• efficient  government  administration  plus  effective  adjudication  (or  punishment).  
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Since  1960,  the  Act  had  undergone  numerous  amendments  to  increase  the  power  of  investigation  of  the  
Corrupt  Practices  Investigation  (CPIB).  In  fact  the  CPIB,  which  was  placed  under  the  direct  supervision  
of   the   Prime  Minister’s   Office,   could   arrest   suspects,   search   arrested   persons,   and   examine   the   bank  
accounts  and  other  assets  of  civil  servants  under  investigations.  The  POCA’s  effectiveness  was  ensured  
by  the  introduction  of  amendments  (in  1963,  1966  and  1981)  and  new  legislation  (in  1989)  to  deal  with  
the  unanticipated  problems9.    
The  Act  sought  to  tackle  sources  of  corruption  directly,  through  a  long  list  of  distinctive  prescriptions:    
• the  CPIB  can  investigate  corruption  in  both  the  public  and  private  sectors  dealing  with  both  the  
giver  and  the  receiver;    
• the   CPIB   can   deal   also   with   cases   in   the   private   sector   since   the   beginning,   because   the  
government  retained  as  of  strategic  importance  to  keep  Singapore  business  environment  as  clean  
as  possible  in  order  to  allow  foreign  investments  in  the  city  –  state;    
• the   introduction   of   the   legal   principle   of   presumption   of   corruption,   when   a   public   officer   is  
found  to  have  received  bribes  and  so,  a  public  officer  charged  in  court  has  the  duty  to  explain  to  
the  court  that  what  he  received  was  not  received  corruptly;  if  he  fails  to  explain  to  the  court,  he  
will  be  presumed  to  have  received  the  money  corruptly  and  so  the  prosecutor  will  be  facilitated  
to  bring  all  the  evidence  to  court;    
• the  introduction  in  the  POCA  also  of  the  principle  that  an  acceptor  of  a  bribe  will  be  considered  
guilty  even  if  he  or  she,  in  fact,  had  no  power,  right  or  opportunity  to  return  a  favour  to  the  bribe  
giver;    
• Court’s   empowerment   to   order   bribe   receivers   to   pay   a   penalty   equal   to   the   amount   of   bribe  
received  apart  from  punishment  in  the  form  of  fines  and/or  imprisonment  terms.    
• when  a  person   is   found   to  have  committed  corruption  offence,   the  principal   could   recover   the  
amount  of  the  bribe  as  a  civil  debt.  
At  present,  over  95  %  of  corruption  cases  brought  before  the  court  lead  to  convictions;  of  all  cases,  public  
officers  account  for  only  10  %  and  the  rest  are  private  persons.  Furthermore,  the  courts  do  not  hesitate  to  
mete  out  deterrent   sentences,   especially   for   corrupted  public  officers  who  will  usually   serve   custodial  
sentences  and  be  stripped  of  their  appointments.  
  
5.  Some   case   studies   about  Singapore’s  public   service   improvements:   the  Housing  &  Development  
Board  (HDB),  the  Port  of  Singapore  Authority  (PSA)  and  the  Singapore’s  Education  System  
One   of   the   most   important   reorganisation   among   Singapore’s   public   service   was   that   related   to   the  
Singapore’s  Housing  &  Development  Board  (HDB):  the  public  housing  authority  and  a  statutory  board  
under  the  Ministry  of  National  Development.    
In  the  early  1960s  there  was  a  relevant  housing  shortage  in  Singapore.  According  to  the  HDB  statistical  
office,   Singaporeans   who   lived   in   the   slums   were   almost   550,000   (30   %   of   the   nation’s   population).  
Furthermore,   there  were  not  private   building   companies   able   to   build   an   adequate  number   of   houses  
that  could  meet  the  population’s  demand.    
On  the  1st  of  February  of  1960  the  HDB  took  over  the  Singapore  Improvement  Trust,  being  tasked  with  
solving  the  nation’s  housing  crisis.  In  less  than  three  years  HDB  built  21,000  flats  and  by  the  1965,  it  had  
built  54,000  flats;  finally,  within  10  years  of  its  institution,  it  had  solved  the  housing  problem.  According  
to  the  HDB  (2012),  nowadays,  about  82  %  of  Singaporeans  live  in  HDB  flats.    
The   institution   of   a   sole   agency   in   charge   of   public   housing   enabled   more   resource   planning   and  
allocation,  allowing  to  the  HDB  to  secure  land,  raw  materials  and  manpower  for  large-­‐‑scale  construction  
to  optimize  results  and  achieve  economies  of  scale.    
After   the  realization  of  54,000  apartment  units   in   five  years,   the  HDB  decided  to   launch  an  ownership  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9  J.S.T.  Quah,  Singapore’s  Experience  in  Curbing  Corruption,  in  Arnold  J.  Heidenheimer,  Michael  Johnston  and  Victor  LeVine  (eds.),  
Political  Corruption:  A  Handbook.  New  Brunswick:  Transaction  Books,  1989,  Chapter  48,  pp.  841-­‐‑853.  
scheme  that  allowed  to  the  applicants  to  buy  flat  by  using  funds  from  their  national  pension;  throughout  
the  years   the  HDB  ensured   to   the  Singaporeans  a  public  housing   towns   characterised  by  high  quality  
homes  and   standard   living   environments.  HDB   is   also   engaged   in   active   research   to   ensure   that   cost-­‐‑
effectiveness  and  quality  standards  were  maintained  and  continually  improved  upon.    
Over   the   years   HDB   renewed   and   upgraded   towns;   in   fact   housing   estates   became   self-­‐‑contained  
satellite  towns  with  their  own  schools,  health  clinic  and  recreational  facilities.  In  the  1980s,  town  councils  
were   formed   to   encourage   collective   responsibility   for  managing   these   estates,  whilst   in   the   1990s   the  
HDB  upgraded  older  flats  and  built  more  condominiums  for  higher-­‐‑income  families  (the  ‘Remaking  Our  
Heartland’   Plan,   a   20-­‐‑30   year   plan   to   transform   HDB   estates   and   towns   into   a   world-­‐‑class   living  
environment).    
These   achievements   are   paradigmatic   about   Singapore’s   capability   to   develop   public   policies  
successfully.  For  example  the  HDB  through  the  establishment  of  Surbana  Corporation,  a  new  consulting  
company,  operated  in  Indonesia  (in  relation  to  new  public  housing  projects)  and  in  other  development  
projects   in   16   Asian   and  Middle   East   cities   providing   consultancy   solutions   (concerning   architecture,  
engineering,   project   and   construction   management,   coastal   engineering   urban   planning,   building  
technology).    
Singapore’s  public-­‐‑housing  policies  attests   that   the  combination  between  good  executions  provided  by  
top  talent  employees  and  clever  political  choices  delivered  by  smart  politicians  is  capable  of  creating  a  
real  virtuous  circle  that  can  improve  the  populations’  social  life  as  well  as  the  country’s  economy.      
  
Since  1959  the  Singapore’s  government  launched  a  series  of  economic  policies  to  increase  and  improve  
the  industrialization  level  of  the  city-­‐‑state.  Among  these  was  also  the  restructuring  of  all  port  operations  
including  the  functions  of   the  Singapore  Harbour  Board,   the  Marine  Department  and  the  Marine  Branch  of  
the  Public  Works  Department10.   This   decision   originated   by   the   government’s  wishes   to   have   only   one  
authority  capable  to  ensure  all  the  port  operations  and  to  eliminate  duplications  of  activities.  In  the  April  
1965,  was  established  the  Port  of  Singapore  Authority  (PSA),  which  operated  as  a  statutory  board  under  
the  supervision  of  the  Ministry  of  Information  and  Communication.  
PSA  took  over  the  functions,  assets  and  liabilities  of  the  Singapore  Harbour  Board,  the  operation  of  the  
pilotage  services  and  the  functions  previously  undertaken  by  the  Marine  Department  (the  regulation  of  
the   navigation   within   the   limits   of   the   port,   the   provision   of   adequate,   efficient   lighthouses   and  
navigational  aids  in  the  territorial  waters  of  Singapore  and  the  promotion  of  the  use,  improvement  and  
development  of  the  port).    
In  February  1996,  some  of  the  services  of  the  PSA,  the  Maritime  Department  and  the  National  Maritime  
Board   of   Singapore   were   merged   to   form   the   Maritime   and   Port   Authority   of   Singapore   (MPA),   a  
statutory   board   under   the   Ministry   of   Communications   and   Information   Technology   (MCIT);   this  
change  aimed  to  create  a  more  dynamic  and  integrated  structure.  
MPA   has   responsibility   for   the   regulation   of   port   and   shipping   services,   while   PSA   manages   the  
container/cargo  terminals  and  other  business  and  commercial  services.  MPA’s  key  mission  is  to  protect  
Singapore’s   strategic   maritime   interests   and   promote   Singapore   as   a   major   port   and   international  
maritime  centre,  through  a  higher  flexibility  and  autonomy11.  
During  the  last  ten  years  Singapore  topped  the  list  of  48  developed  and  developing  economies  in  terms  
of   the   extent   to  which  port   access   infrastructure  met   business   requirements.   PSA   remains   the  world’s  
biggest  container  trans-­‐‑shipment  port,  with  connections  to  700  ports  worldwide  through  more  than  300  
shipping  lines  out  of  Singapore.  Furthermore,  PSA  spends  close  to  $100  million  a  year  on  research  and  
development  to  improve  its  services  quality.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10  J.  S.  Pillai,  Historical  assessment  of  the  Port  of  Singapore  Authority  and  its  progression  towards  a  ‘High-­‐‑Tech  Port’,  Asia  Pacific  School    
of  Economics  and  Government  Discussion  Paper,  2005,  n.  19.  
  11	  K.  Trace,  Asian  Ports  since  1945:  Maritime  Change  and  Port  Rivalry  in  F.  Broeze,  Gateways  of  Asia:  Port  Cities  of  Asia  in  the  13th-­‐‑20th  
Centuries,  1997  (London:  Kegan  Paul  International),  p.  332.  
The  results  of  such  management  modalities   is   that  Singapore’s  port   freight  traffic   flows  have  the  same  
trend  as  that  of  Shanghai  port,  which  has  a  greater  tradition  in  this  specific  economic  activity.12  
  
After  the  independence  from  the  British,  Singapore’s  government  understood  that  education  would  be  a  
strategic  factor  in  the  creation  of  a  unified  and  modern  nation  with  a  high  quality  workforce  class  able  to  
reach  the  ambitious  economics  aims  that  the  PAP  leadership  had  set  for  Singapore.    
Singapore’s  challenges  in  its  education  system  have  been  driven  by  the  following  elements:    
• a  small  economy,  which  must  stay  open  to  remain  relevant  to  the  world,  but  then  acutely  feels  
the  effects  of  globalisation;    
•   an  economy  with  no  natural  resources  and  which  must  by  necessity  develop  its  own  people  to  
their  fullest  to  survive;    
• a  young  immigrant  nation  with  a  multi-­‐‑racial,  multi-­‐‑religious  make-­‐‑up  that  must  stay  cohesive.  
  
Education  strategies  and  policies  adopted  from  the  Singapore’s  governments  have  evolved  through  few  
phases:    
a)   ‘Survival   –   Driven’   was   established   during   the   two   decades   after   the   independence   in   1965   from  
Malaysian   Federation;   the   government’s   main   goal   was   to   survive   and   to   build   a   nation   out   of  
immigrants   in   an   ex   –   British   colony.   The   PAP   leadership   thought   that   education   had   to   build   social  
cohesion   and   national   identity.   Facing   with   low   student   enrolment   and   mass   unemployment,   the  
government   built   quickly   a  high  number   of   schools   and   equipped   all   the  population  with  basic   skills  
that  made  them  employable  in  labour  –  intensive  work.  
b)   ‘Efficiency   –  Driven’   program   started  when   Singapore’s   economic   and   social   conditions   improved.  
Therefore,  the  government  in  the  late  1970s  started  to  improve  the  efficiency  of  the  educational  system,  
considering   that  drop  –  out   rates  were  still  high  despite   the  enrolment   rates.  Education  was  geared   to  
become  more  efficient  and  effective  through  streaming  and  a  standardized  curriculum.  These  initiatives  
were  taken  as  a  way  to  sort  students  into  classes,  which  reflected  their  academic  and  language  aptitudes  
as   demonstrated   in   examination   results.   The   intention   was   for   brighter   students   to   advance   to  more  
challenging  and  specialised  school  programmes,  while  students  who  were  less  academically  able  would  
have  the  option  of  learning  trade  skills  in  vocational  institutions,  rather  than  drop  out  of  school  entirely  
and  enter  the  workforce  with  limited  skills.  
c)  ‘Ability  –  Based’  and  Aspiration  Driven’  programmes  commenced  in  the  late  1990s,  when  Singapore  
transited  into  a  knowledge  -­‐‑  based  economy.  Thereby,  the  government  priority  was  to  develop  a  broader  
range  of  skills  such  as  critical  thinking  and  creativity,  and  to  devolve  more  autonomy  to  the  schools  to  
encourage  innovation  and  cater  to  a  wider  variety  of  interests  and  aptitudes  in  the  students.  
In  2004,  the  government  carried  out  a  new  initiative  (Teach  Less,  Learn  More),  by  which  instruction  moved  
further  away  from  the  rote  memorization  and  repetitive  tasks  to  deeper  conceptual  understanding  and  
problem-­‐‑based   learning.   In   2008,   the   practice   of   grouping   the   students   into   ability-­‐‑based   tracks   was  
abandoned   with   students   organized   in   three   different   “bands”   in   secondary   school   based   on   their  
ultimate   educational   goal.   Although   students   choose   the   majority   of   their   classes   to   be   within   their  
bands,  they  can  take  classes  in  other  bands  depending  on  their  aptitude.    
Recently,   Singapore   introduced   new   politics   to   further   support   teacher-­‐‑led   professional   development  
and   work-­‐‑life   balance;   furthermore   the   government   founded   teachers’   training   courses   for   a   more  
holistic   approach   to   education   in   primary   and   secondary   schools.   Finally,   the  Ministry   has   rolled   out  
new   initiatives   dedicated   to   providing   financial   aid   for   students   in   need,   signalling   a   renewed  
commitment  to  educational  equality.  
It  is  well  known  that  the  quality  of  the  teacher  is  one  of  the  major  determinants  of  student  learning  and  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  World  ranking  of  freight  traffic  flows  in  the  world  top  ten  ports,  measured  in  TEU  (acronym  of  twenty-­‐‑foot  equivalent  unit,  the  
standard  measure  of  volume  transport  of  ISO  containers.)  can  be  found  in  the  World  Shipping  Council  website.  
so,  the  significant  enhancement  of  Singapore’s  students’  performance  is  the  result  of  effective  policies  in  
teacher  recruitment,  development  and  retention.  
Throughout   these   years   the   Ministry   guaranteed   quality   by   providing   only   one   teacher   preparation  
institution   in   the   nation   for   Singapore’s   public   school:   the   National   Institute   for   Education   (NIE).  
Therefore,  working  hand-­‐‑in-­‐‑hand  with  the  Ministry,  the  NIE  is  capable  of  providing  high  standards  of  
preparation  and  support  that  are  aligned  to  the  policies  of  the  ministry  and  the  needs  of  the  schools.  
Each  year  the  Ministry  opens  as  many  places  in  teacher  education  as  needed  to  meet  in  future  vacancies  
anticipated  by  trends  in  teacher  retirement.  So  students  that  want  to  start  a  career  as  teachers  must  be  in  
the  top  third  of  their  graduating  class  based  on  the  following  issues:    
• grades,  national  examinations;    
• the  teacher  entrance  proficiency  exam;    
• interview   process   to   determine   if   they   have   the   passion,   commitment,   values,   and  
communication  skills  to  be  good  teachers  and  role  model  for  their  students.    
Singapore   Ministry   of   Education   during   the   last   thirty   years   was   capable   of   hiring   high   performing  
students   as   teachers   through   a   combination   of   competitive   salaries   (at   the   same   level   to   those   of  
engineers   in   the   civil   service),  payment  of   all   tuition   fees,   a  monthly  wage   to  undergraduate   teaching  
candidates,  the  provision  of  opportunities  for  individual  growth  and  development.  
As   for   the  other  areas  of   the  public  administration,   selectivity  operates  at  every  phase  of   the   teachers’  
careers:   the  system  is  always  seeking  to   identify  excellence.   It  starts  with  the  teacher  practicum,  where  
candidates  can  earn  distinction  and  receive  a  higher  entry  salary,  and  continues  through  the  three  career  
tracks:  teaching,  leadership  and  content  specialist.    
Within  each  is  a  career  ladder  based  on  performance.  The  annual  evaluation  determines  the  size  of  the  
annual  bonus  and  whether  one  moves  up  the  ladder  in  salary  and  position.  Only  the  very  good  teachers  
can  move  up  to  senior  teacher  positions  and  only  the  best  get  to  be  master  teachers.  
Finally,  it  is  important  to  underline  that  because  teachers  appreciate  the  evaluation  system  they  respect  
the  teachers  who  move  up,  and  they  work  to  learn  from  them  so  they  can  improve  as  well.  
  
6.  Overview  of  the  structural  weakness  affecting  the  Italian  administrative  system  
During  the  last  twenty  years  the  Italian  economic  and  social  growth  has  been  strongly  hampered  by  the  
inefficiency  of  its  Public  Administration  (P.A.).  In  a  logical  governance  framework,  public  administration  
should  act   like  an   ‘engine’   capable   to   sustain   the  economic  and   financial  growth  of   a   country.  On   the  
contrary  very  often  the  P.A.  does  not  offer  any  support  in  terms  of  services  delivered  to  the  citizens  and  
entrepreneurs.  
Numerous   studies   indicate   that   the   Italian  public  administration   is  often   slow,  with   level  of   efficiency  
and  effectiveness  that  vary  significantly  across  the  regions  and  susceptible  to  favouritism.  Additionally,  
the  excessive  bureaucracy  and   its   low  efficiency   in   the  management  of  public   funds  cause   indirectly  a  
constant   taxation’s   increase.   These   statements   are   confirmed   by   the   World   Governance   Indicators13  
(WGI),  which  suggest  that  Italy  is  not  a  good  performer.    
Related  to  the  above  mentioned  features,  during  the  last  thirty  years  the  level  of  corruption  is  increased  
considerably  because  of  the  infiltration  of  organised  crime  in  many  economic  activities  where  the  role  of  
the  public  administration   is   sizable.  According   to   the  Transparency   International   (a  non-­‐‑governmental  
international   organization)   Italy’s   accountability  principles   and   integrity  mechanisms  are  poor  both   at  
political  and  administrative  level.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  The  Worldwide  Governance   Indicators   (voice   and   accountability,   control   of   corruption,   rule   of   law,   regulatory   quality,   government  
effectiveness,   policy   stability)   are   a   research   dataset   summarizing   the   views   on   the   quality   of   governance   provided   by   a   large  
number   of   enterprise,   citizen   and   expert   survey   respondents   in   industrial   and  developing   countries.   These   data   are   gathered  
from  a  number  of  survey  institutes,  think  tanks,  non-­‐‑governmental  organizations,  international  organizations,  and  private  sector  
firms.  
The   studies   carried   out   on   the   level   of   corruption   in   the   Italian   public   sector   indicate   that   the  
parliamentary   and   the   government   codes   of   conduct   are   totally   hypothetical   and   not   enforceable.   In  
particular,  both  in  the  nineties  and  in  the  two  thousand  years  no  government  has  been  able  to  plan  an  
appropriate  and  effective  anti-­‐‑corruption  legislation,  in  particular  regarding  the  law  enforcement.  
The   law   n.   190   of   6  November   2012,   the   so-­‐‑called   ‘anti-­‐‑corruption   law’,   should   be   an   important   step  
towards   a   more   transparent   and   efficient   public   administration.   However,   although   it   prevents  
retaliatory   action   being   taken   against   whistle   blowers   and   protects   their   identity   (including   allowing  
evidence   in   court   to   be   given   anonymously)   there   are   some  weaknesses   in  what   is   otherwise   a   solid  
framework.  For  example,  while   the   law  may   forbid   retaliatory  action   it  does  not   specify  what  kind  of  
compensation  might  be  due  if  this  provision  is  violated  nor  specifies  any  sanctions  against  an  employer  
who  retaliates14.    
Also,  there  is  no  protection  for  whistle  blowers  in  the  private  sector,  nor  for  contractors,  consultants  or  
former  public  employees,  as  the  law  protects  only  “public  employees”.    
Since  at  least  the  1990s,  eighteen  governments  tried  to  introduce  measures  to  improve  the  public  sector’s  
efficiency  through  a  series  of  legislative  reforms.  One  of  the  most  prominent  efforts  to  improve  the  P.A  
public  services  delivery  has  been  carried  out  by  the  Minister  Bassanini  in  the  second  half  of  the  1990s  (by  
the  approval  of  a  substantial  number  of  laws:  law  59/97;  law127/97;  law  191/98;  law  50/99)15,  and  by  the  
Minister  Brunetta  with  the  Legislative  Decree  n.  150/2009.    
Bassanini  laws  intended  to  renovate  the  P.A.  through  a  holistic  approach  whose  macro-­‐‑objectives  were  
the   reshaping   of   the   State,   the   modernization   of   the   organisational   structures   and   functions,   the  
innovation   of   the   delivery   of   public   services,   the   renewal   of   the   culture   of   public   institutions,   the  
reinvention  of  the  mission  of  public  bodies.    
The  ‘Brunetta  Reform’  added  provisions  for  greater  transparency  and  performance  management  process  
simplification  as  the  incentive  system  was  aimed  to  give  equal  reward  to  all  managers  independently  of  
their  performance.      
However,   despite   some   appreciable   results   at   the   beginning   (the   reduction   in   employment   size,   some  
liberalizations,  partial  diffusion  of  self-­‐‑certification,  the  reduction  in  some  agencies,  the  abolition  of  the  
document  chasing  and  the  improvement  of  the  performance  monitoring)  both  attempts  at  reform  did  not  
affect  the  public  sector’s  performances.  
The  reasons  of  such  partial  failure  can  be  identified  mainly  because  of  the  insufficient  financial  resources  
(since   the  mid   1990s)   for   incentives,   the   non   proper   allocation   of   power   between   politics   and   senior  
bureaucrats  with  responsibility  of  each  and  transparency  on  performances,  resistance  by  politicians  and  
public  managers  to  preserve  the  status  quo.  
In  relation  to  this  latter  aspect,  for  example,  the  improved  monitoring  of  the  performance  reward  system  
of   the   ‘Brunetta   Reform’   has   reduced   but   not   eliminated   the   phenomenon   whereby   there   is   a   tacit  
agreement  between  politicians  and  bureaucrats  to  set  performance  standards  that  are  easily  reached.  
Therefore,   one   can   conclude   from   the   above   cited   that   the   conservative   behaviour   of   the   ruling   class  
prevents  the  system  from  rewarding  exceptional  efforts16.  
The  public  administration  crumbling  has  been  one  of  the  effects  of  the  law  59/97,  which  has  overturned  
the   traditional   criteria   by   which   devolution   of   the   functions   and   the   administrative   tasks   have   been  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  OECD:   Integrity   review   of   Italy:   Reinforcing  Public   Sector   Integrity,   Restoring  Trust   for   Sustainable  Growth,   Better   Policies   Series,  
2013a.  
15  In   particular,   Bassanini   laws  were   related   to   the   following   aspects:   i)   administrative   ‘decentralization’   and   strengthening   of  
local  powers  and   independence;   ii)   restructuring  of   central  administration  and  public  agencies   (which  determined  a   reduction  
and  reorganization  of   these   institutions)  and   liberalizations;   iii)   simplification  of   laws  and  procedures   (between  them  the  most  
relevant  were   self   certification;   yearly   simplification   law;   simplification  unit;   regulatory   impact   analysis);   iv)   reform  of   public  
administration   structures   also   through   a   digitalization   plan   (introducing   incentives,   transparency,   separation   of   politics   from  
administration).  
16  P.  O'ʹBrien,  Policy  Implementation  in  Italy:  Legislation,  Public  Administration  and  the  Rule  of  Law,  OECD  Economics  Department  
Working  Papers,  2013,  No.  1064,  OECD  Publishing.    
shared   by   and   among   the   State,   the   regions   and   the   local   government.   In   2001   these   principles   have  
entered  the  constitution  with  the  reform  of  the  article  117  of  the  Italian  constitution.  
Therefore,   a   relevant   number   of   matters17  are   subject   to   a   concurring   legislation   according   to   which  
regions  may  exercise  an  autonomous  legislative  power  in  the  respect  of  the  state  fundamental  principles.  
The  state  is  required  to  intervene  when  the  regions’  power  is  lacking  or  ineffective.  
According   to   a   study   of   the  OECD   entitled   ‘Regulatory  Reform   Italy:   Ensuring  Regulatory  Quality   across  
Levels   of  Government’   and   published   in   2007,   the   relevant   degree   of   fragmentation   of   public   bodies   and  
duplication  of  responsibilities  between  the  central  and   local  authorities  make  any  policy-­‐‑making  effort  
and   innovative   process   of   change   unable   to   produce   relevant   improvements.   This   aspect   has   a  
consequential   increase   in   the   level  of  complexity  of  administrative  procedures  and  burdens  due   to   the  
proliferation   of   legal   sources   (scarcely   intelligible   from   the   citizens),   in   the   number   and   length   of   the  
obligations   (causing   a   relevant   increase   of   the   quantity,   duration   and   uncertainty   of   administrative  
procedures)  and  finally  it  causes  a  waste  of  public  financial  resources.    
An  important  problem  of  the  Italian  P.A.  is  the  administration  of  the  justice  at  large,  and  in  particular  the  
critical   state  of   the  civil   justice.   In   fact,  according   to   the  official  data  of   the  Ministry  of   Justice,   in  2012  
there  were  more  than  six  millions  of  civil  cases  pending  before  the  Italian  courts.  The  average  length  of  
civil  proceedings  is  eight  years.  Among  the  countries  of  Western  Europe  Italy  has  the  worst  performance  
regarding  the  length  of  the  judicial  proceedings18.    
Also  for  the  civil  justice,  since  the  early  1990s  several  governments  announced  some  important  reforms  
capable  to  solve  the  many  problems  affecting  this  specific  sector  of  the  public  administration.  However,  
as  the  other  reforms  of  the  public  administration  already  examined,  also  in  this  case  the  Italian  legislator  
thought   things   can   be   improved   by   changing   only   the   procedural   regulations   and   leaving   the  
environment  in  which  such  regulations  are  supposed  to  work  untouched.  
The  features  described  throughout  this  paragraph  show  that  the  political  class  in  Italy  up  to  now  made  
only   few   steps   towards   a   significant   improvement   of   the   public   sector.   This   unsatisfactory   situation  
reflects   the  strength  of   the  conservative  pressures  which  characterise  the  Italian  ruling  class.  However,  
this  cultural  attitude  has  been  boosted  by  the  lack  of  political  principals.    
The  forthcoming  attempts  to  reform  the  Italian  P.A.  should  take  into  account  first  of  all  the  possibility  to  
simplify,  step  by  step,  the  huge  amounts  of  laws  that  ineffectively  regulate  the  public  sector.  Afterwards,  
we  retain  that  several  positive  elements  which  characterise  Singapore’s  public  administration  could  be  
easily  introduced  in  the  Italian  P.A.  no  matter  how  its  current  institutions  are  structured.  
  
  
7.  Key  lesson  from  the  Singapore  Civil  Service  and  conclusions    
In  the   last   twenty  years,   the  ability  of   the  Italian  political  system  to  make  relevant  reforms  is  very  low  
and  so  the  combination  of  the  Italian  policy  makers  incapacity  to  provide  effective  reforms  of  the  public  
sector,   which   could   ameliorate   the   living   and   working   conditions   of   the   Italian   citizens   and  
entrepreneurs,  and  the  deep  economic  and  financial  crisis,  might   lead  towards  a  period  of  great  social  
instability  especially  if  the  households  purchasing  power  continues  to  fall.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17  The  subject  matters  include  the  international  and  EU  relations  of  the  Regions,  foreign  trade,  transport  and  navigation  networks  
along  with  the  promotion  of  cultural  activities,  scientific  innovation  and  technological  research  in  support  of  the  productive  
apparatus  and  many  other  sectors  and  activities.  In  all  areas  of  their  responsibilities,  the  Regions  may  conclude  agreements  with  
foreign  states  and/or  local  authorities  of  other  states,  though  in  the  forms  established  by  the  State  legislation.  
18  According  to  the  official  statistics  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  between  1959  and  2010  Italy  scored  the  highest  
number  of  violations  of  the  principle  according  to  which  an  essential  component  of  the  right  to  a  fair  trial,  as  elucidated  by  art.  6.1  
of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights,  is  the  ‘reasonable  length’  of  judicial  proceedings:  see  the  file  ‘Violation  by  Article  
and  by  Country  1959  –  2010’,  at  <  http:  //www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/2B783BFF-­‐‑  39C9-­‐‑455C-­‐‑B7C7-­‐‑F821056BF32A  /0/  Tableau  
_de_  violations_19592010_ENG.pdf>.  This  explains  why  60%  of  the  violation  judgments  issued  against  Italy  concern  the  length  of  
proceedings:  see  ‘Statistics  for  Italy  on  1  January  2009’,  at  http://www.echr.  coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/B21D260B-­‐‑3559-­‐‑4FB2-­‐‑A629-­‐‑
881C66DC3B2F/0/CountryStatistics  01012009.pdf>.  
Time   has   expired   and   the   next   government,   replacing   the   current   one   (characterised   by   the   same  
persistent   low   reform-­‐‑minded   attitude   of   the   former   governments),   must   adopt   a   series   of   measures  
already  used  for  the  governance  of  the  Singapore  public  sector.  Among  them  the  most  relevant  are:  
1)  Ensure  that  investments  in  e-­‐‑government  services  are  geared  towards  increasing  the  users’  uptake  by  
systematically   linking   simplification   of   procedures   with   opportunities   to   carry   out   administrative  
practices  online.    
2)  Measure  perceptions  of  burden  reduction  by  business  and  citizens  and  use  this  opportunity  to  engage  
in  consultations  with  business  and  citizens  to  fine-­‐‑tune  implementation  of  administrative  simplification.  
3)   Sustain   the   effort   towards   a   more   effective   public   administration   through   the   systematic   use   of  
administrative  reviews   to  balance  quality  of  service  delivery  and  efficient  public  spending.   In   fact,   the  
set   of   reforms   launched   since   2008   (aimed   to   enhance   public   administration   productivity   (through   a  
string   focus  on  performance)  did  not   affect  positively   the  quality   of   services  delivered   to   the   citizens.  
Therefore,   to   scale   up   reform   and   ensure   that   performance   based   human   resources   management   is  
delivered   for   the   public   administration   and   the   citizens,   it   is   important   to   rely   on   high-­‐‑quality  
performance   indicators   that   track   output   and   outcomes   appropriately   and   provide   important   tools   to  
assess  the  public  administration  performance19.      
4)   Continue   moving   towards   a   performance-­‐‑focused   public   administration   through   high-­‐‑quality  
indicators   that   systematically   track   public   administration   performance.   The   construction   of   a  
meritocratic   environment   within   the   Italian   public   sector   must   consider   the   systematic   use   of  
administrative  reviews  to  balance  quality  of  service  delivery  and  efficient  public  spending,  as  well  as  the  
employment   of   high   quality   indicators   (reported   in   the  most   relevant   economic   literature)   capable   to  
track  systematically  the  public  administration  performance.  
As   concerns   this   aspect   we   think   that   a   meritocratic   process   can   be   implemented   also   through   new  
policies  capable  to  attract  the  best  universities’  graduate  students  and  midcareer  transfers.  However,  this  
process  can  be  put   in  place   in  a  very  effective  way,   if   it   is   tightly   linked  to  a  substantial   reform  of   the  
Italian  education  system,  which  is  characterised  also  by  relevant  problems20.  
5)  An  effective  fight  against  the  corruption.  This  factor  is  essential  to  support  long-­‐‑term  growth  and  also  
restore  trust   in  government,  considering  that  Italian  companies  and  citizens  have  identified  corruption  
as  a  key  factor  that  exacerbated  the  debt  crisis.    
However,  the  answers  provided  by  the  numerous  governments  that  have  succeeded  to  lead  the  country  
have  been  totally  ineffective;  also  the  “Anticorruption  Bill”  adopted  by  the  Monti’s  government  in  2012,  
as  well  as  the  “Brunetta  reform”,  despite  offering  some  decent  legislative  provisions,  due  to  the  lack  of  
effective   penal   and   administrative   sanctions   to   fight   corruption   crimes   are   substantially   ineffective   to  
develop  supporting  mechanisms  to  further  instil  a  culture  of  integrity  among  civil  servants.                          
Therefore,  we  think  that  the  Singapore’s  government  holistic  approach,  which  adopts  at  the  same  time  
effective   acts   (laws),   effective   enforcement,   effective   adjudication   (considering   that   sure   detection   and  
strict  enforcement  of   laws,  must  be  always  complemented  by  effective  adjudication),  effective  integrity  
risk  management   system  and  an  efficient   reward  system  related   to   the  public  officers  performances   is  
the  best  way  to  fight  effectively  corruption  levels.  
6)   Breadth   of   training   is   another   factor   that   plays   a   key   role   towards   an   improvement   of   the   public  
administration  performance.   In   fact,  as   the   top   talent   in   the  private  sector   tends   to  constantly  upgrade  
his/her   skills   to   adapt   to   new   technologies   and   new   business   processes,   also   the   talent   in   the   public  
sector  must  follow  this  type  of  approach,  trying  to  improve  its  functional  and  soft  skills.  We  think  that  
also   in   a   period   characterised   by   a   deep   financial   and   economic   crisis,   through   the   application   of   an  
effective  spending-­‐‑review  process   the   Italian  public  sector  can   increase   training  and  variety  of  courses  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19  OECD:  Italy  reviving  growth  and  productivity,  2012,  Better  Policies  Series.  
20   The   European   House   Ambrosetti,   The   Italian   educational   system:   six   proposals   for   meeting   the   emergency,   2008,  
http://www.ambrosetti.eu/en/management-­‐‑consulting/scenari-­‐‑e-­‐‑strategia/scenarios/case-­‐‑histories/focus-­‐‑education/download-­‐‑
education?set_language=en.  
and   adjust   personal   development   plans   to   highlight  where   an   employee   needs   to   improve   his   or   her  
knowledge8.  
  
Of  course,  also  the  Singapore  public  sector  has  some  areas  of  concern.  One  of  the  most  relevant  is  that  
there  is  a  strong  emphasis,  as  concerns  scholarships  and  academic  achievement,  to  support  only  the  so-­‐‑
called  “potential  candidates  to  leadership  positions”  (candidates  who  are  not  excellent  in  the  classroom  
but  possess  innate  leadership  qualities).    
However,  if  on  one  hand  this  kind  of  approach  identifies  and  locks-­‐‑in  since  the  beginning  the  designated  
candidates  for  senior  positions,  on  the  other  may  discourage  other  employees  who  could  express   their  
potentialities  in  the  future.      
Furthermore,  the  background  of  the  administrative  officer  corps  is  quite  homogenous;  it  means  that  this  
aspect   can   limit   the   possibility   to   solve   problems   through   a   diversity   of   perspectives   and   ideas.   The  
public  service  recognizes  such  problems  and  is  currently  re-­‐‑examining  the  trade-­‐‑offs  of  efficiency  versus  
effectiveness,  which  may   lead   to  more   engagement   and   empathy  with  public   concerns.  Civil   servants  
attend  new  courses  in  public  engagement  and  communication  and  they  are  holding  also  more  sessions  
with  ordinary  citizens  to  understand  better  their  problem  and  their  concerns8.    
As   already   reported   in   the   introduction,   Singapore   is   characterised   by   a   unique   situation,   which   is  
evidently  very  different  from  the  one  in  Italy  in  terms  of  size  and  political  conditions.  This  last  aspect  is  
probably   the  most  notable,   considering   that  Singapore   is  essentially  a   stable  authoritarian  single-­‐‑party  
regime  (considering  that  People'ʹs  Action  Party  has  won  control  of  the  Parliament  with  large  majorities  in  
every  election  since  self-­‐‑governance  was  secured  in  1959),  while  Italy  has  been  always  characterised  by  a  
permanent  political  instability.  
Nevertheless,   there   is   one   question:   can   it   be   possible   to   foresee   that   also   in   Italy   a   government  
supported  by  a  robust  parliamentary  majority  (after  a  decent  reform  of  the  electoral  law)  could  be  able  to  
implement  structural  socio-­‐‑economic  changes  that  the  country  needs?    
In  fact,  especially  in  the  last  four  years  there  is  a  wide  demand  from  the  public  opinion  to  deal  with  all  
the   problems   affecting   the   effectiveness   and   efficiency   of   the   Italian   administrative   and   institutional  
framework.   Public   opinion  patience   towards   the   Italian  politicians   is   getting   thin,   and   the   nowadays-­‐‑
continuous   protests  must   be   interpreted   as   forms   of   “anti-­‐‑politics   behaviour”,  which  may   generate   a  
season  of  social  protests  and  unrest.    
It   is   evident   that   the  majority   of   these   critical   issues   are   particularly   problematic   to   be   faced   by   this  
political  class  that  sustained  the  “technocratic  government”  and  now  is  supporting  the  so-­‐‑called  “larghe  
intese”   government.   This   is,   in   fact,   the   same   political   class   that   has   been   ineffective   for  many   years.  
They  proved  to  be  unsuccessful  dealing  with  the  nation'ʹs  decline  and  in  formulating  solutions  to  create  
growth.  
However,   in  consideration  of   the  seriousness  of   the  problems  affecting  the  country,  any  political  party  
that   will   get   the   power   after   the   next   elections,   must   set   up   immediately   a   new   agenda   for   proper  
reforms  with  the  right  priorities,  trying  to  apply  the  above  mentioned  best  practices.      
There  are  no-­‐‑excuses,  since  it  is  only  a  matter  of  political  willingness  to  commence  this  long  trip  towards  
a   better   country,   with   grand   ambitions,   able   to   return   to   play   an   important   role   in   the   international  
arena.  
  
